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ABSTRACT 
Twelve markets were studied. All markets had downward sloping supply functions created 
by Marshallian-type external economics. The conditions were such that the Marshallian theory of 
dynamics gave predictions opposite to the Walrasian theory of dynamics. The market organizations 
studied were double auction, sealed bid/offer and (secant) tiltonnement. In all cases the Marshallian 
theory of dynamics was the better model. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
MARSHALLIAN VS. W ALRASIAN ST ABILITY 
IN AN EXPERIMENT AL MARKET* 
Charles R. Plott and Glen George 
California Institute of Technology 
The experiments discussed below are an attempt to examine concepts of stability as found in 
economics textbooks. Two concepts of stability, which stem from two different concepts of market 
adjustment, seem to have dominated thinking. One was advanced by Walras and the other by 
Marshall. Since these two concepts lead to competing hypotheses about the conditions under which 
market instability will be observed, the subject is a natural one for experimental investigation. 
Furthermore, since this is the first experimental examination of the stability of equilibria, the strategy 
is to inquire about stability in the context of these two classical models and to avoid the temptation 
to attempt to extend them or integrate them with more modem theory. The old models have not 
been checked. They seem to be an appropriate place to start. 
The Walrasian model views price as changing in response to excess demand at that price. 
The Marshallian model views volume as adjusting in response to the difference between demand 
price and supply price at that volume. These two models hold different implications for general 
theories of disequilibrium and market adjustment, and they make different statements about the 
conditions under which markets will exhibit instability. If supply is negatively sloped and if demand 
cuts supply from above, then the equilibrium is Walrasian unstable and Marshallian stable. If supply 
is negatively sloped and if demand cuts supply from below, then the equilibrium is Walrasian stable 
and Marshallian unstable. In Figure 1 the downward sloping supply function is the curve SS. Given 
the demand function D 1 D 1 D i. three equilibria exist excluding the boundaries. Points c and e are 
Walrasian unstable and Marshallian stable. Point d is Walrasian stable and Marshallian unstable. 
The vertical boundary contains an additional stable Walrasian (but not Marshallian) equilibrium and 
the horizontal boundary contains an additional stable Walrasian (but not Marshallian) equilibrium. 
If the demand function is D2 D2 D2, point c is Walrasian (Marshallian) stable (unstable) and point d
is Walrasian (Marshallian) unstable (stable). Point e is no longer an equilibrium. The vertical axis 
contains a Marshallian (but not Walrasian) stable equilibrium and the horizontal axis contains a 
Walrasian (but not Marshallian) stable equilibrium. 
* The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged as well as support from the 
California Institute of Technology Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. 
This project wa:s first assigned as a project in an experimental economics class. Stephen Pitts contributed significantly to 
the development of instructions and to finding parameters of the continuous model that yielded acceptable integer solutions. 
The comments of John Ledyard and Jeffrey Dubin influenced the experimental design and data analysis. Comments by 
Gary Becker and Eskander Alvi were useful in helping us understand the theories and_the literature. Special thanks go to 
Jessica Goodfellow for her help as a research assistant. 
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The curves in Figure 1 are continuous approximations of the parameters actually used in the 
experimental markets. Presumably only the stable equilibria can be observed. The markets first 
exist under conditions D 1 and according to theory the emerging prices should be near to one of the 
stable equilibria. If demand is then shifted to D 2, then prices and volume should move to one of the 
other equilibria because every stable equilibrium under D 1 is unstable under D2. This relationship 
among the equilibria is the key to the experiments reported in the paper. 
Two major problems present themselves to anyone who attempts to conduct experiments on 
these models. The first and most difficultis determining a method for experimentally inducing a 
negatively sloped supply. The markets created for this study all have "forward falling" as opposed to 
"backward bending" supply curves. The second problem involves a choice of market institutions. 
Three different market organizations are studied: the double auction, the sealed bid/offer, and the 
secant tiitonnement. 
Three basic questions are posed by the research. The first deals with the applicability of the 
law of supply and demand. If the downward sloping supply curve is forward falling, it is not 
obvious that the textbook concept of equilibrium (the intersection of demand and supply) applies. 
The supply curve involves elements of consistent expectations. Furthermore, allocations and prices 
that are equilibria under the definition that market demand equals market supply might not satisfy 
the definition of equilibria in game theoretic models of the same environment. The question is: does 
the market demand and supply model predict price and volume? The second question is: does either 
concept of stability have predictive power? It is not obvious that these classical notions of stability, 
which originated by analogy to physical phenomena (Walras 1954, p. 112; Guillaband 1961, p. 346), 
have any predictive power at all in a market context. The third question asks which stability concept 
is more appropriate. The final question is an inquiry about the sensitivity of answers to all of the 
above questions to market organization. Certainly the usual description about Marshallian vs. 
Walrasian stability leans heavily on the existence of a price taking process such as tiitonnement. 
Does the relevance of a stability concept depend upon how the market is organized? 
II. PARA.METERS
The market demand and market supply functions based upon the actual parameters used in 
the experiment are shown in Figure 2. Subjects were primarily undergraduate students and graduate 
students from the California Institute of Technology. Preferences and costs were established by 
application of standard financial inducement techniques (see Plott 1982 or Smith 1982). The actual 
instructions are included as an appendix. 
A. The Demand Curve 
Six agents were designated as demanders. These demanders were partitioned into two 
demanders of each of three types. The redemption values are in Table 1. Buyers were given two 
tables. One contained their marginal redemption values for all periods, and the other contained 
totals. 
Two different aggregate demands were used. These are labeled condition D 1 and condition 
D 2 as shown in Figure 2. In most experiments a shift of demand occurred in period 10. The first ten 
periods were under condition D 1 and then the demand was shifted to D 2• However, in some 
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TABLE 1 
Redemption Value Table for Demanders 
Condition D 1 Condition D 2 
Agent Agent 
Unit 1&6 2&5 3&4 1&6 2&5 3&4 
1st 960 880 800 590 610 630 
2nd 600 640 720 570 530 530 
3rd 440 410 410 480 510 510 
4th 350 390 390 200 280 320 
5th 330 310 290 120 40 0 
6th 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 
experiments conditions D 1 were maintained longer than ten periods to see if convergence to a 
theoretical equilibrium would become "closer " with more periods under the same demand 
conditions. 
B. The Supply Curve 
The literature discusses three forms of negatively sloped supply. The "backward bending" 
curve is usually associated with "backward bending" individual supplies derived from negative 
income effects. The backward bending labor supplies are the typical example. The second form is 
the "forward falling" supply curve associated with the existence of an extemality. According to the 
forward falling concept, specialization in resource functions and resource supplies has the effect of 
lowering costs as an industry grows. Competition is maintained in the forward falling case because 
individual firms have upward sloping marginal costs, given the volume of others. Lowered costs are 
translated to lower prices through competition. The third form of negative sloped supply involves 
falling average cost at the individual firm level. This latter case theoretically results in monopoly. 
Our choice was to study the second form. The first, backward bending, necessitated the 
existence of at least two commodities. Conceptually, the appropriate two commodities could be 
created in a laboratory setting but practical problems associated with experimental methodology 
precluded an immediate examination of this case. The third form is interesting and has received 
some attention experimentally. The monopoly case, however, is not in the full spirit of the 
Marshallian vs. Walrasian stability issue. Our decision was to study the second "forward falling" 
form. 
The forward falling supply curve is usually attributed to "external economies" of scale. As 
market volume increases, the cost to each firm decreases even though an individual firm 's cost 
increases with an increase in its own volume (volume of other firms held constant). Technically 
speaking, this is an extemality in the cost function of each firm. That is, a firm 's costs depend upon 
its own output and the output of all other firms. 
In general, each firm has a cost function of the form Ci (X; •Lj'#ixj ). The cost function of
firm i depends upon its own output, X;, and the output of all other firms, Lj'#ixj. The latter is the
key extemality. 
The theory of competitive behavior yields an individual supplier 's behavioral equation of the 
form. 
accx;,ql) 
P = ---­ax; 
where P = market price
q{ =individual i 's expectation about the quantity sold by others ; i.e., Lj#Xj. 
Application of the theory of competitive supply yields an individual supply function of the form 
X; =si(P,q{).
(1) 
(2) 
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The theory of consistent conjectures yields 
qf = I;Xj for all ij'f.i 
at equilibrium. 
Together the theory of competitive market supply gives a summation of eq. (2), and
substitution from eq. (3) yields a market supply function
Xs = s(P).
(3) 
(4) 
The continuous approximations of the actual parameters used in the experimental markets 
will make the model precise. Let ai be parameters specific to seller i .  By assumption� and y are
parameters common to all sellers. The cost function of each firm is given by : 
(5) 
The data were given to subjects in total cost tables which were evaluations of eq. (5) and also in the 
form of marginal cost tables which were evaluations of 
The actual tables seen by subjects are included as an appendix. Of course, each subject was 
informed of only his (her) own parameters. By applying consistent conjectures (3) and from (6),
individual supply functions are characterized by the relation 
xi= [� ] Cai+ �P +ypj).'Y J'l-1 
Aggregate supply satisfies the relation 
which reduces to the supply function where Xs is the market supply quantity
(6) 
(7) 
( 8) 
(9) 
8 
The objective of having a negatively sloped supply curve places some obvious parametric 
restrictions on (9). In particular we chose 
axi axi 
y > l � -- > --()p axj � = yy so 
Under the above assumption the aggregate supply function is of the general form 
X _Li 
ai y nyP
s - + . 1-ny 1-ny 
The actual parameters chosen for the supply function were 
n =6 
y =6 
1 y=-
3 
2 1 
N =-6- ab =-6- a =-6""a 3' 3' c • 
(10) 
The indexes a, b , c , can be recognized as seller "types." Each seller of a given type had identical
cost parameters. For all experiments there were two sellers of each given type (e.g., two sellers had 
parameters aa, etc.). A graph of this continuous approximation is in Figure 1 and the actual
parameters are in Figure 2 as the curve SS. The equation with a 240 scaling factor for P is 
XS = 38 - 1/20 p.
III. MARKET ORGANIZATION
While the stability notions themselves require no qualifications regarding market 
organization, much recent experimental work leaves no doubt that market organization is potentially 
important. The stability ideas themselves give hints about the form of organization that might favor 
one theory over the other. The Walrasian stability concept, for example, would seem to be most 
appropriate when a t�tonnement process is used. 
Three different organizations were studied. The first is the double auction. In this process 
buyers tender bids and sellers tender asks publicly. Trading is open for a limited period of time 1 
with a large number of potential bids and asks possible. One important feature of this organization is 
that market volume; i.e., the volume of others, is observed during a period. Participants are able to 
1. This is true for the computerized MUDA of experiment 4 but not for the first three experiments. In the single unit oral 
auction, trading within the final fifteen seconds automatically added thirty seconds to the clock. In the single unit case the 
variable-length period was thought to be necessary to avoid biasing the results toward one of the equilibria. If the time 
period was short, the bias could be in favor of a small volume equilibrium. If it was long, a large volume equilibrium might 
be favored as individuals trade to avoid boredom, attempt to collude, etc., in the extra time. The feature was unnecessary in 
the MUDA because of the speed at which volume can move. 
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make decisions during a period contingent upon the volume that has already occurred in that period. 
Sellers also know that their own volume will affect the costs of others in ways that might induce 
others to sell more. Thus, from a practical point of view the double auction has potentially important 
features. 
The second organization studied was a sealed bid/offer market (see Smith et al. 1982). 
Buyers and sellers each list the prices at which they wish to buy or sell each unit. That is, each 
participant submits a demand or supply function. These functions are aggregated in the ordinary 
way and the equilibrium is computed. The last accepted and first excluded demand and supply units 
determine the price. The market price is computed to be midway between the minimum of the last 
accepted bid and first rejected offer and the maximum of the last accepted offer and first rejected bid. 
The second organization is interesting for two reasons. First, because of the "excluded price 
auction" feature, demand revealing aspects exist, though this is not to imply that this mechanism is 
demand revealing. 2 Second, a special case of the sealed offer institution is that in which suppliers
bring a fixed quantity to the market which they will sell whatever the price. In any case, suppliers 
cannot make their offers contingent upon the actions of others in these markets so one might expect 
the stability if not the equilibrating properties of this process to differ from the double oral auction. 
The third process is the secant tatonnement. In this process the experimenter (price adjuster) 
announces a price. Agents respond with quantity offers at that price. If excess demand is zero, or if 
some other stopping rule is involved, the process stops and trade takes place at the announced price. 
If conditions for stopping are not satisfied, then a new price is announced. Many different formulas 
for revised price announcements can be imagined. In these experiments the secant process is used. 
In the experiments it was common knowledge that price changes follow the formula 
where ED1 is the excess demand at t; i.e., it is the sum of amounts demanded minus the sum of 
amounts supplied at 
P
1• Notice that the process is potentially unstable. If excess demand is positive, 
then prices will increase or if excess demand is negative, prices will decrease. This quality is exactly 
the unstable behavior that underlies the Walrasian concept. 
The process stopped according to two rules. 
(1) If excess demand is zero, then the price change is zero and the process stops.
(2) If I P, - Pi-l I is small enough, then a rounding procedure will treat the quantity as 
ED1 - ED1-1 
zero and the process stops even though excess demand is not zero. This latter property can 
be important in cases of horizontal demand or supply curves. 
2. Participants are trading multiple units. Consequently, extramarginal units can have a strategic use. 
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Very little is known about the behavior of tfttonnement processes. Operational problems 
involved with implementing such a process abound. The secant process as opposed to a process 
often referenced in the literature (i.e., X = aED) was chosen as the first to study because natural
stopping rules existed in the presence of discontinuities.3
IV. MODELS
Two aspects of the economic environment are of interest. The first is the set of equilibria 
and the second is the detail of the dynamic models. The classical analysis will be maintained 
throughout the paper. That is, only the market demand and supply functions will be used as the 
basic parameters of the environment. We will indicate those points where we are aware that this 
classical model produces results inconsistent with modem game theory. 
The Walrasian definition of equilibrium is not the same as the Marshallian definition. 
Walras defines a price to be an equilibrium if the quantity demanded at that price equals the quantity 
supplied at that price. Marshall defines a quantity to be in equilibrium if the demand price and 
supply price are equal at that quantity. Both authors also defined equilibria as limit points of a 
dynamic process. 
Neither author discusses problems caused by discontinuities so latitude remains to apply 
these theories in ways that appear reasonable. In this -paper an equilibrium is either a point that 
satisfies a static definition or it is the limit point of a dynamic process. 
Table 2 lists the equilibria. The letters correspond to the points as located in Figure 2. 
Under both demand conditions, D 1 and D 2, the interior points c ,  d, e are equilibria according to 
both theories. At the indicated price, quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. Some ambiguity 
can result if the Marshallian definition of equilibrium, that demand price equals supply price, is used. 
Strictly speaking, demand price and supply prices are never equal in the environment given the 
discrete curves as drawn. However, the Marshallian dynamics would "push" the system to the 
Marshallian stable points in the set { c , d, e} if  the Marshallian model of dynamics is  correct. 
The boundary points do not have the symmetry of the interior points. The equilibrium 
properties of these points change according to the demand conditions and the theory. 
In summary, under condition DI> Marshallian theory would predict equilibration near points 
{c, e} and Walrasian would predict {a, d, g }. Under conditions D2 Marshallian theory would 
predict points { b , d} while W alrasian would predict {a , c , f } . That point a is a Walrasian
equilibrium under condition D 1 is a departure from a game theoretic analysis. At prices that high, 
some producers would be willing to supply even if others produced zero. Thus at prices that high, 
the support of game theory is lost. 
We will now tum to the dynamic models. Since the continuous approximation of the 
parameters leads to a piecewise linear model, the analysis will be in terms of a linear model. Let the 
demand equation be 
(11) 
3. The proportional r ule for adjustment has been studied by Patrick Joyce (1984). 
11 
TABLE 2 
Condition D 1 Condition D 2 
Point Price* Quantity Marshall Walras Marshall Walras 
a 96 0 0 non eq. stable eq. non eq. stable eq. 
b 6 30 0 non eq. non eq. stable eq. non eq. 
c 500-540 12 stable eq. unstable eq. unstable eq. stable eq. 
d 380-410 18 unstable eq. stable eq. stable eq. unstble eq. 
e 140-180 30 stable eq.** unstable eq. non eq. non eq. 
f 0 28 non eq. non eq. non eq. stable eq. 
g 0 30 non eq. stable eq. non eq. non eq. 
* Price reflects conditions D 1• Under D 2 the range would be narrower. 
** Strictly speaking, this point is not an equilibrium because the demand price is so high. However, quantities on both 
sides have dynamics that move this direction according to Marshall. 
12 
and the supply equation be 
where Xd and X8 are the demand and supply quantities respectively and when Pd and P s are the 
demand price and supply price respectively. 
The Marshallian theory of dynamics is 
The Walrasian theory of dynamics is 
A problem exists in making these theories operational. The following assumptions will be used : 
Assumption 1. The time t refers to an experimental period. 
Assumption 2. X1 =the observed number of transactions in period t. 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
Assumption 3. X1 = Xd. That is, the observed number of transactions can be interpreted as Xd in the 
demand equation (11). 
Assumption 4. Disequilibrium movements lie on the demand curve. This means that equation (11) 
is always satisfied. 
Assumption 5. The speeds of adjustment functions G (·) and F O in (13) and in (14) are linear. That 
is G(Pd -P8) =a · (Pd -P8) andF(Xd -X8) = � · (Xd -X8).
Assumptions 1 through 5 together with (11) and (12) yield the following implications of (13) 
and (14). 
Marshallian Theory 
dX.1 [ X1 -ad X -a ] 
---;;;- = U'VMarsha/l (X,) =a bd - I bs 
s ' 
Walrasian Theory : 
a > O  (15) 
(16 )  
13 
�>0. 
Under the assumptions listed above and the maintained hypothesis of the theory regarding the 
market demand and supply, the only unobserved variables in (15) and (17) are the speed of 
adjustment parameters a and �. 
Under the linearity assumption the relationship between the two theories is 
- =-.1:!...bdbs - . 
dXj R dXj 
dt Walras a dt Marshall
(17) 
(18) 
Since bd b8 > 0 in the downward sloping case and since � > 0 by the maintained hypotheses of thea 
two theories, the two theories give almost diametrically opposed predictions. The predicted 
direction of movement will always be the opposite. However, the quantitative relationship can be 
affected by boundaries and by the nonlinearity of the demand function. Nevertheless, because the 
functions are piecewise linear the relationship (18) is true for large segments of the price and 
quantity space. 
V. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A total of twelve experiments were conducted. Table 3 summarizes the treatment 
conditions. The first four experiments were double auctions (DA). The first three of these four were 
conducted under constant demand conditions as single unit double oral auctions (DOA). The DOA 
process required more time than was anticipated. In addition the system was not equilibrating as 
anticipated so a decision was made to keep demand constant. Since the multiple unit double auction 
(MUDA) used in experiment 4 is faster,4 a demand shift was implemented in that market. Near the
end of experiments 2 and 4, the location of a Walrasian stable equilibrium was announced. The 
price was written on the chalkboard and each person was given a number representing the volume of 
others. We then asked the quantity each would want to trade at the (publicly announced) price if the 
volume of others was as indicated. The quantities were then collected and summed and the 
consistency with the hypothetical volume demonstrated. In experiments 8, 11, and 12, trades 
actually took place and the exercise was called a period. In experiment 4 each individual was told to 
assume that the volume of all 
other individuals was fifteen. The period was then opened. The theoretically predicted 
volume of eighteen occurred so all participants then knew that profitable trading at that volume was 
possible. 
Experiments 5, 6, 7, and 8 were conducted as sealed bid offer (SBO) auctions. For these, 
because of the speed of the market we were able to implement the shifting demand design as 
planned. 
4. The MUDA was computerized. The program can be found in Johnson, Lee, Plott (1988). 
Experiment 
1 
2 
3 
4 (previously experiment 13) 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1
12 
14 
TABLE 3 
Market Organization 
DOA 
DOA 
DOA 
MUDA 
SB0'1 
Tatonnement 
Tatonnement 
Tatonnement 
Tatonnement 
Demand Conditions 
D 1 all 6 periods 
D 1 all 10 periods 
(period 1 1  deleted-had been 
preceded by announcement) 
D 1 all 10 periods 
(period 1 1- 12 deleted-had 
been preceded by announcement) 
D 1 periods 1-9 
Dz periods 10-24 
Announce P* = 400 X* = 1 8
after period 1 1, reiterate 
announcement after period 13. 
D 1 periods 1-9 
Dz periods 10- 14 
D 1 periods 1-9 
D2 periods 10- 15 
D i periods 1- 14 
Dz periods 15-20 
Di periods 1- 14 
Dz periods 15-24 
Announce P* = 400 X* = 1 8
after period 20. 
D 1 periods 1-9 
Dz periods 10- 13  
D 1 periods 1-9 
Dz periods 10- 12 
Di periods 1-9 
Dz periods 10- 15 
Announce P* = 400 X* = 18
after periods 1 1  and 12. 
D i periods 1-9 
D2 periods 10- 19 
Announce P* = 400 X* = 18
after periods 1 1  and 12. 
a . Public information at the end of a period included the highest bid, lowest bid, lowest accepted bid, and highest 
accepted ask, price, and volume. 
b . The highest rejected bid and lowest rejected ask were announced along with the information described in footnote a . 
15 
Experiments 9, 10, 1 1, and 12 were all secant tatonnement. Demand was held at D 1 for the 
first nine periods and was shifted to D 2 beginning the tenth period. Demand condition D 2 was 
maintained for two to four periods after which the experiment terminated or an experimenter 
intervention occurred. The intervention was in the form of an announcement which demonstrated 
the existence of the (Marshallian stable) equilibrium at P* = 400, X* = 18. After such 
announcements were made, the experiment continued for a few periods. 
VI. RESULTS
Figures 3, 4, and 5 contain an example of a time series from each of the three different types 
of market organization. Table 4 contains the average price and volume for all periods of all 
experiments. The table indicates when the shift from D 1 to D 2 occurred and when information 
about equilibria was announced. In the first four experiments under the double auction processes, 
prices vary within a period so the average price does not contain all of the information. In all other 
experiments all transactions took place at the same price. 
Remark 1. The demand and supply model is not as accurate in the downward sloping supply case as 
it has been in other studies involving upward sloping supply functions." 
In order to understand the remark study the final periods of D 1 for experiments 1, 4, and 10. 
In these markets volume is about midway between two equilibria and prices are off by 20 percent or 
more. Usually the accuracy of the competitive model falls within 5 percent or so. The problem is 
seen again in the volume predictions. In all but two experiments volume was below predictions in 
the last period of D 1 and it was never above. Thus the errors of the model are systematic and 
occasionally large. 
Conclusion 1. For all experiments under conditions D 1 before the demand shift, prices and volume 
converge nearer to point c than to any other equilibrium. This point is Marshallian stable and 
W alrasian unstable. 
Again observe the data in the last period of condition D 1• For all experiments the stable 
Marshallian equilibrium nearest the data is point c and the nearest Walrasion stable equilibrium is 
point a. All but five of the twenty-four datums are closer to c than to a. The exceptions are prices 
in experiments 1, 8, 10, and 13 and volume in experiment 10. On average, the price predictions of
the (stable) Marshallian model has a 14 percent of price and a 3 unit volume error. By contrast the 
(stable) Walrasian model exhibits price predictions that are on average off by 20 percent and volume 
predictions that are off by 9.6 units. The equilibria of the Marshallian stable model are better. 
Conclusion 2. For all experiments under conditions D2 after the demand shift, the data are nearer 
point b than to any other equilibrium. This point is Marshallian stable and Walrasian unstable. 
Consider the final period of condition 2 before any announcements are made about the 
locations of equilibria. The data are closer to the stable Marshallian equilibrium b than to the stable
w 
u -
Q:'. 
0... 
1000 
875 
750 
625 
SUPPL l' 
DE"ANO 
-
-
-
-
-
""' 
. . 
-----· . 
-.. 
••••• 
.. 
- .. 
SOD ---------------------- - -----�· .. ·--
375 
250 
125 
0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
0 10 20 30 
OUANT ITY 
40 
-
-
I ...... 
""' 
-
-< 
- - - - - - - �- --. 
•• 
_____ ,. _ 
2 3 4 
FIGURE 3 
. . - -. '-
. - - ------
5 
. . . ... . . . .  . 
. . ... . - 1 ·­.. ,,.. 
- - - -·- - - -·- - - - ---
6 7 8 
PERIOO 
All Contracts from Experiment 3, Double Oral Auction 
. . 
.. .. - 1--· 
9 10 
-
°' 
1000 
875 
750 
625 
w 
u sou 
Q:'. 
0.. 
125 
SU,,lT 
DfftMO 
IPERIOOS 1-141 
0£11111111 
-
-
IPERIOOS 16-201 -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-·- -·-
-·-
·i-:1:======-t======'=======:l========•=======l=======+====--l-===-=-l====--=J�J======-1�1r-----1-=:=-
- ._.... - - - - -... - - - - - - -1- - --- - - . . - - - - - • - ------ ... _ - ----- - ... --- ---- .. ------- - ______ ... _ ::: ___ _ 
- - ----------· - ____ ... ------.... ------ ·------·------- ... _ -------· ------- ... _____ - __ ... ___ - __ _,._ - ------
. - - - . • · ::: : : ·t:: :: :: 1:::::: I::::::: 1-::;:::: :t :: ::: :: 1::: :: ::-� · ·· · - · •- · · - - · - -
-
-
-
-=1-----t-- --- - -t ·----- .... -- ---- 1----- - - .. - - ------t------- 1------ --t- --- - - - -1--------· - - - -- - - ... - -------- -- ----- .. ----- --
-
- - - - -· - - -- - __ ._ - ----- ... ----- . - ---- -- ... _ -- -----·-- ---- .... ---- - ---- ------ .... - - -----· - ---- - - "' - - - - - - - ....  -------. - - -----
0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
0 10 20 !O 
QUANTITY 
tO 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FIGURE 4 
9 10 
PERIOD 
l l 12 
All Contracts from Experiment 7, Sealed Bid/Offer 
13 14 15 16 17 181920 
...... 
-...) 
w 
u 
� 
O::'. 
0... 
1000 
1175 
750 
625 
SOD 
315 
2so--t 
0 
SUPP LT 
OEllA•O "ElllOOS 1-11 
OEllA•O 
--
IPElllOOS 10-111 -
11 I 
10 20 30 
QURNTITY 
40 
-
-
--
.J==C�:r-·-_____ .. _____ _ 
:::ii=::::::::: -----
-l--- - - - J -----+--- --+ - ---+----+-----+-----1------+---- - �--- -+-11---- ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ----- -- ---
2 3 4 5 6 7 
FIGURE 5 
6 9 10 11 
PERIOD 
12 
All Contracts from Experiment 12, Tatonnement 
I:::::::::: :J:::::::: :J:: :: 
'=---------
1:---------
13 14 15 16 17 16 19 
...... 
00 
19 
TABLE4 
Volume and Average Price for All Periods of All Experiments 
Experiment Period Vol. Av. Price Experiment 
!DA• I 13 602.3 6SB/O 
2 11 549.4 
3 8 564.5 
4 4 622.5 
5 4 639.8 
6 7 627.9 
2DA I 10 558.0 
2 12 562.9 
3 9 569.4 
4 12 561.2 
5 12 556.7 
6 12 553.3 
7 11 553.6 
8 12 553.8 
9 13 539.5 
10 12 541.6 
3DA I 10 513.0 7SB/O 
2 JO 612.5 
3 8 650.0 
4 20 519.2 
5 12 578.8 
6 12 572.5 
7 12 552.9 
8 10 565.0 
9 10 570.0 
10 9 564.4 
4MUDA0 1 8 627.5 
2 8 632.3 
3 6 631.7 
4 6 633.7 
5 8 648.9 
6 7 646.6 
7 7 649.0 
8 7 653.1 
9 8 659.0 
Treatment Chamre 
10 0 
11 0 8SB/O 
Treatment Chanoe 
12 19 456.1 
13 1 450.0 
Treatment Chanoe 
14 20 403.9 
15 17 419.4 
16 14 438.9 
17 10 455.5 
18 7 467.1 
19 4 500.0 
20 6 450.0 
21 18 461.1 
22 18 452.6 
23 15 464.7 
24 17 472.3 
5 SB/Oc 1 13 440.0 
2 13 440.0 
3 10 500.0 
4 11 600.0 
5 11 600.0 
6 10 610.0 
7 10 609.0 
8 10 599.0 
9 10 599.0 
Treatment Chanoe 
10 7 560.0 
11 6 585.0 
12 4 594.0 
13 3 600.0 
14 I 600.0 
a. Double auction 
b. Multiple unit double auction. 
c. Sealed bid/offer 
d. Tatonnement 
Period 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Vol. Av. Price 
6 600.0 
12 525.0 
12 500.0 
12 500.0 
12 500.0 
12 500.0 
11 503.0 
11 530.0 
11 545.0 
Treatment Chanoe 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
7 
7 
7 
5 
3 
4 
8 
11 
11 
9 
12 
12 
12 
12 
11 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
533.0 
538.0 
550.0 
575.0 
591.0 
580.0 
512.0 
534.0 
577.0 
602.0 
598.0 
583.0 
572.0 
565.0 
599.0 
591.0 
782.0 
555.0 
600.0 
560.0 
Treatment Chanoe 
15 8 530.0 
16 8 554.0 
17 6 575.0 
18 3 595.0 
19 1 610.0 
20 0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
10 475.0 
11 500.0 
11 500.0 
7 550.0 
8 599.0 
9 630.0 
10 629.0 
10 615.0 
10 600.0 
10 620.0 
10 622.0 
9 611.0 
10 623.0 
10 619.0 
Treatment Chanoe 
15 6 559.0 
16 5 590.0 
17 3 600.0 
18 2 615.0 
19 1 629.0 
20 0 
Treatment Chanoe 
21 18 400.0 
22 15 500.0 
23 11 511.0 
24 9 530.0 
Experiment 
9 T" 
lOT 
11 T 
12T 
Period Vol. Av. Price 
1 8 546.0 
2 10 577.0 
3 9 568.0 
4 10 578.0 
5 10 583.0 
6 12 579.0 
7 10 580.0 
8 11 573.0 
9 10 583.0 
Treatment Chan2e 
10 3 572.0 
11 3 567.0 
12 1 591.0 
13 3 564.0 
1 12 454.0 
2 12 528.0 
3 6 645.0 
4 8 605.0 
5 9 571.0 
6 9 614.0 
7 6 626.0 
8 5 622.0 
9 5 635.0 
Treatment Chan2e 
10 1 630.0 
11 1 602.0 
12 0 631.0 
1 8 633.0 
2 9 615.0 
3 10 632.0 
4 10 607.0 
5 10 608.0 
6 10 605.0 
7 9 602.0 
8 10 609.0 
9 11 600.0 
Treatment Chan2e 
10 2 619.0 
11 0 602.0 
Treatment Chan2e 
12 18 400.0 
13 18 400.0 
14 17 371.0 
15 18 386.0 
1 12 567.0 
2 10 592.0 
3 11 581.0 
4 9 584.0 
5 10 590.0 
6 11 598.0 
7 10 617.0 
8 11 590.0 
9 10 590.0 
Treatment Chan11e 
10 7 582.0 
11 0 615.0 
Treatment Chanae 
12 18 400.0 
13 18 400.0 
14 13 435.0 
15 6 541.0 
16 3 586.0 
17 2 600.0 
18 0 631.0 
19 6 552.0 
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Walrasian equilibrium c in seventeen of the eighteen cases. The exception is the price data in 
experiment 9. On average the price predictions in the stable Marshallian model are off by 3 percent5
and the quantity predictions are off by 0.9 units. By contrast the price predictions of the stable 
Walrasian are off by 20 percent on average and the volume predictions is off by 1 1  units on average. 
The Marshallian and Walrasian models are fundamentally theories of dynamics rather than 
theories of equilibria. Comparison of equilibria does not explore the nature of price movements and 
thus does not get to the essence of the difference in approach. In order to give a direct test of the two 
models, discrete variations of ( 15) and ( 17) were used. Specifically, the estimated models were 
X1 = observed market volume in period t
k E {Marshall, Walras } 
'JI Marshall (X,) =(Pd - Ps) Ix 
I 
'VWalras (X,) = (Xd - Xs) I · x, 
(19) 
(20) 
(2 1) 
The values of 'JI Marshall (X1) are observable without additional theory of the adjustment process. The
value of 'Jfwatras (X1) can be observed as a result of assumptions ( 1) through (5) as was demonstrated
in equation ( 17). The magnitudes can be estimated by application of equation ( 19). Both dynamic 
theories predict 
bk >0. 
However, by virtue of the experimental design it is unlikely to observe bk > 0 for both k since over 
wide ranges of the variables, the models differ only by a negative constant of proportionality. 
However, the models are estimated separately because differences can occur in certain areas of the 
observation space because of the nonlinearities. The models were estimated over several restricted 
data sets. First all of the data prior to announcements were used. Then, the models were checked 
using only first period data. The models were also estimated with the inclusion of data after 
announcements. These perturbations of the data resulted in no changes in the conclusions. The 
estimates in Table 5 are those for the data before any parameter announcements were made. Since 
the announcements were not implemented sufficiently systematically to be considered as treatment 
variables for purposes of statistical analysis, the data after announcements were not used to obtain 
the regression results reported in Table 5. 
5. These figures assume that the prices are at the Marshallian equilibrium when zero quantity and no prices are observed. 
This makes the Marshallian model look better but does not change conclusions. In a process like tatonnement, prices are 
observed without trade. 
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TABLES 
Estimated Coefficients, t-statistic, Durbin-Watson Statistic, and Adjusted R2
M =a + b 'Jf k 
\jf measured by Marshall \jf measured by Walras 
N a 6 DW R2 a 6 DW R2
Double Auction 48 -1.64 .038 2.03 .459 .623 -1.62 2.14 -.027 
(-2.33) (5.62) (.677) (-2.64) 
Sealed Bid/Offer 69 -.198 .031 P* = .243 .651 -.198 -12.37 P* = .243 .651 
(-.73) (11.12) (-.73) (-.11.12) 
Tatonnement 47 -1.20 .034 P* = .233 .528 -.103 -4.36 1.754 .004 
(-2.24) (7.48) (-.173) (-1.105) 
*An AR(l) was run to correct for autocorrelation. 
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Conclusion 3. The Walrasian model can be rejected in favor of the Marshallian model in all three 
organizations. 
In Table 5 the estimate of adjustment term, 6, is positive and significant under the
Marshallian model. Contrary to the predictions of the Walrasian model, the 6 is always negative
and significant except in the tatonnement where it is not significant. Adjusted R 2 are always better
under the Marshallian model. The size of the estimated coefficient, G, seems small under the
Marshallian adjustment theory but in reality the size is simply a result of the units involved in the 
independent variable, '¥Marshall (X1 ). A change of units would change the slope without affecting the
intercept. 
The support for the Marshallian model is not all positive. Both theories predict that the 
intercept term will be zero. As shown in Table 5, ak is significantly negative for two of the three
processes according to the Marshallian model. However, the magnitudes are small. We conjecture 
that they result from nonlinearities in the adjustment process or perhaps from the fact that the 
markets tended to equilibrate with volumes less than the equilibrium. 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 contain all regressions. The horizontal axis contains the magnitudes of 
'VkO fork E {Marshall, Walras }. In the Marshallian case this is the difference between demand
price and supply price at the market quantity. In the Walrasian case this is the excess demand 
implied by the market quantity on the assumption that movement is along the demand curve. The 
vertical axis measures the change in market quantity that occurred for the next period. As can be 
seen, the slopes for the Walrasian adjustment model always have the wrong sign. Slopes for the 
Marshallian model are always positive as predicted by theory. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper explored the two classic theories of stability found in the literature. The stylized 
results are as follows. 
1. The law of supply and demand works with reasonable accuracy. Even though the data fall short
of strong support for the model (see Remark 1), the result is surprising because the supply model
involved a substantial rational expectations component.
2.  Stability seems to be a property of equilibria. Shifts in the demand which cause an equilibrium 
to become unstable are followed by movement away from the equilibrium. 
3. The Marshallian stability model captures the observed phenomena and the Walrasian model does
not. Between the two models Marshall is the appropriate one.
4. The conclusions above are independent of market organization. The Marshallian model is the
appropriate model even when the market is organized by tatonnement.
The most important question has not been answered. In terms of modem theory, why does 
the mechanical adjustment theory advanced by Marshall appear to work? Modem theory has 
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advanced far beyond the mechanical idea of demand and supply to focus on the details of individual 
information processing and strategic behavior. Does the Marshallian model have a firm foundation 
in modem theory? Or, was it an accident resulting from a choice of parameters and procedures that 
made the Marshallian model look good? Will the result hold up in the backward bending supply 
case? The prospect was advanced years ago that the two conditions of supply, forward falling and 
backward bending, might be characterized by different stability properties.6
For some reason the Marshallian concept of stability was dropped from consideration by the 
profession. The Walrasian model has been almost universally applied. While it is much to early to 
claim that the practice is wrong, these data suggest that reassessments are in order. 
6. I am indebted to Eskander Alvi for calling to my attention Kahn (1933). 
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APPENDIX 
Auctioneer's Introduction 
Each or you should now have a folder. Once  the folders are opened there 
s hould be no talking exc ept to ask me questions and to participate in the market .  
You may now o pen your fo lders. In  each folder there should be a number o f  
pages .  The  first o f  these  should be labeled "Buyer No." or "Seller No.". How many
buyers are there? Will all buyers please raise their hands . How many se llers are 
there? Will all se llers please raise their hands. 
l will now read the instructions aloud and you can follow along .  I will periodi­
cally stop tor questions .  Please  wait until then to ask a question. 
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You are Buyer No. 
In this packet yo u should find 5 items . 
( 1 )  This page. 
(2) A set of stapled pages  labeled instructions. The last page is labe led Ex­
ample (Buyer). The numbers used in this example have no relationship to those to be 
used in the actual market. They are for illustrative purposes  only. 
(3) A sheet labeled Record. of Purchases and. Earnings, the Record Sheet.
This sheet is to be  used iri calculating your profits. The numbers on this sheet  are 
those that will be  used in the actual market. 
(4) A number of bid submittal forms labeled Bid. Form. These are to be used
for submitting your bids in the market. 
(5) A pad of yellow paper which may be used as  scrap paper.
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You are Seller No. 
In this packet you should find 6 items .
(1) This page .
( 2 )  A set o f  stapled pages  labeled Instructions. The last page is labeled Ex­
ample (Seller). The numbers used in this example have no relationship to those to be 
used in the actual market. They are for illustrative purposes  only. 
(3) A sheet labeled Record. of Sa.les and. Profits, the Record. Sheet. This sheet
is to be used in calculating your profits . 
(4) A sheet labeled Cost Sheet. The numbers on this sheet are those that will
be used in the actual market. 
(5) A number of offer submission forms labeled Offer Form. These are to be
used for submitting your offers in the market. 
(6) A pad o t  yellow paper which may be used as scrap paper.
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Instructions 
General 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making . Various 
research foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are 
s imple a nd if you fo llow them carefully and make good  decisions you might earn a 
c o nsiderable amo unt of money which will be  paid to  you in cash. 
We are go ing to c onduct a market in which some or you will be buyers and 
some or you will be  sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods .  In thts 
packet you will find a sheet. labeled either Record of Purchases cmd Ea.rnings or 
Record of Sa.les a.nd Profits, whic h  describes the value to you of any decis ions you 
might make .  You a.re not to revea.l this in/orma.tion to  a.nyone. It  i s  your own private 
info rmation. 
The type of currency used in this market is francs .  All trading and earnings 
will be in terms of francs. Each franc is worth do llars to you. Do not re­
vea.l this number to a.nyone. At the end of the experiment your francs will be con­
verted to  dollars at  this rate ,  and you will be paid in do llars . Note that the more 
franc s you earn. the more dollars you earn. 
3 1  
Specific Instructions to Buyers 
During each market period you are free to purchase as many units as you 
might want.  For the first unit that you buy during a trading period. you will rec e ive 
the amount lis ted in row ( 1 )  marked 1 st unit redemption value; i f  you buy a sec ond 
unit during the same trading period. you will receive the additional amount listed in 
row (5) marked 2nd unit redemption value; etc. The profit from each purchase (which 
is yours to keep) is computed by taking the difference between the redemption value 
and purchase price of the unit bought. Note th.a.t you may not buy a. unit for a price 
which excee ds the red.emption va.lue. Therefore , 
[your profit = (redemption value) - (purchase price ) ] .  
Suppose ,  f or  example , that you buy two units and that your redemption value 
for the 1 st unit is 6000 and for the 2nd unit is 4500 .  It you pay 3500 for each unit ,
your profit i s :  
profit  from 1 st  unit = 6000 3500 = 2500 
profit from 2nd unit = 4500 3500  = 1 000  
tota l  profit = 2500 + 1 000  = 3500  
The b lanks on the  Record. Sheet will help you record your profit. The purchase pric e 
of  the 1 st unit you buy during the first period should be recorded in row (2) .  You
should then record the profit on this purchase as directed on  row (3 ) .  Do the same 
(in the appropriate rows) for any additional units bought in this period. At the end o f  
the period record the total profit in  the last row on the page ,  row  (4 1 ) .  Subsequent 
periods sho uld be  recorded s imilarly in the appropriate co lumn (period 1 in co lumn 
( 1 ) ; period 2 in c olumn (2 ) ;  e tc . ) .  
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Specific Instruc tions to Sellers 
During each market period you are free to se ll as many units as you rrug ht be 
able to .  The pro fit fro m each sa le (which is  yours to keep) ts computed by taking the 
difference between  the price at which you sold the unit and the cost  of  the unit .  �ote  
that you ma.y sell a unit at  a price below the cost  o f  the unit .  Therefore ,  
[your profit = ( sale price )  - ( cost) ] .  
Yo ur cost  depe nds upon your volume and the volume of others. This means 
that when you se ll units you will not know your costs with c ertainty. Yo ur costs  wtll 
b e  known only at the end ot a period when the total volume of sales is known. Exam­
ine your Cost Sheet. If the volume of others is zero ,  that is ,  you were the only one 
who so ld units , then the cost  o f  each  o r  your units is found in the co lumn labeled 0. I f  
the volume of others is  23 then the cost o r  e ach o t  your units is found in the c olumn 
labeled 23.
Suppose ,  for  example , that you so ld two units in a market in which a to tal o f  
t e n  units were sold. Find the appropriate column in your Eza.mple Cost Shee t  (as  il­
lustrated on the chalkboard) . Since the volume of others is B units , the cos t  to you o f  
the 1 s t  unit is 1 50 0  and the cost  or the 2nd unit is 2000 .  It you so ld e ach unit for
3500 ,  your profit is : 
profit from 1 st  unit = 3500  
profit from 2nd unit - 3500 
tota l  profit = 2000 
1 500  = 2000 
2000 = 1 500  
+ 1 500  = 3500  
The  blanks on the Record. Sheet will help you record your profit. The  sale pric e o f  the 
1 s t  unit you se ll during the first  period  should be  recorded in row ( 1 ) .  The same
should be  done ( in the appropriate rows) for any additional units so ld in this period.  
At the e nd of the period, e nter the market volume of  the period in row (A) ,  enter your
volume in row (B) and subtrac t  row (B) from row (A) to determine the resulting 
volume of others which is entered in row (C) .  Then look on  your Cost Shee t  to nnd 
your unit costs .  On the Record. Sheet enter the cost  of the 1 st  unit in row (2 ) . Yo u
should then record the profit on  this s ale as  direc ted  in row (3) . After c o mputing the 
profit for  each  unit sold, record the total  profit for that period in the last row o n  the 
page,  row ( 4 1 ) .  Subsequent periods should be recorded s imilarly in the appro priate 
c olumn (period 1 in column ( 1 ) ; period 2 in column (2) ;  etc . ) .
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Marke t  Organization 
{Sealed Bid- Offer Auction) 
The market for this commodity is organized as  follows : we open the market for 
( ' ' ) a trading period a trading day . Participants will transact units by submitting bids
or offers which may be accepted or rejected.  Each participant will decide how many 
bids or offers to submit by filling out the Bid. Forms or Offer Forms with the buyer or 
se ller number ,  the period number, and the amount . Under no conditions may a buyer 
make a bid for a unit that is higher than the redemption value for that unit .  Since 
sellers do not know the ir costs until the end of the period they may offer any amount 
for a unit. 
Bids and o ffers are accepted or  rejected each period as follows : the Bid. Forms 
and Offer Forms will be collected from all buyers and sellers . The individual bids will 
then be ordered from highest bid to lowest bid.  Likewise ,  the individual o ffers will be 
ordered from lowest offer to highe s t  offer. The bids and offers are then matched: 
highest bid to lowest offer, second highest bid to second lowest offer ,  etc .  Each of 
these matched bids and offers are accepted as  long as  the amount o f  the bid is more 
than the amount of the offer.  For e xample , if there are bids of 3000 ,  3500 ,  4000,  and 
4200 and offers o f  2000 ,  3000 ,  3300 ,  3500 they will be matched as follows: bid of  4200 
with offer  of  2000 ;  bid of  4000 with offer o f  3000 ;  bid o f  3500 with offer o f  3300 ;  and 
bid of  3000 with offer o f  3500 .  The bids and offers in the first three of  these matched 
sets will be accepted and the remainder will be rejected .  Ties will be resolved ran­
domly. After the winning bids and offers have been determined the highest accepted 
bid ,  lowest accepted offer.  last accepted bid and offer .  and first rejected bid and offer 
will be announce d  along with the market volume . The bid and offer forms will also be 
returned with each bid or offer marked " accepted" or  " rejected" and the price of 
the " accepted" bids or offers.  Each buyer and se ller will then fill in the column on 
the Record. Sheet for that period with the prices  of  his / her  accepted bids or offers. 
All accepted bids and offers will be transacted at the same price .  This price is 
the average o f  the maximum of o f  the la.st accepted. offer and the first rejected. bid. 
and the minimum of the la.st accepted. bid. and the first rejected. offer. In the previo us 
example the price would be 3400 ( the maximum of the la.st accepted. offer and the 
first rejected. bid. is 3300 and the minimum of the la.st accepted. bid. and the first re­
jected. offer is 3500)  as shown on the chalkboard.  
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Pinal Observations 
1 .  Trading period 0 will be a trial period to familiarize you with the pro­
c e dure and will not count toward your cash earnings .  
2 .  Each individual has a larg e folder.  All papers , instructions. records ,  etc .  
should be put into this folder.  Leave the folder with us  before leaving . Ta.Ice noth'ing 
home with you. 
3 .  W e  are able t o  advise you a little o n  making money. First ,  you should 
remember that pennies add up. Over many trades and a long period or time very 
s mall amounts earned on individual trades can add up to a great deal o r  money. 
Secondly, you should not expect your e arnings to be steady. You will have some good 
periods and some bad periods .  During bad times try not  to become rrustrated. Just 
stay in there and keep trying to earn what you can .  I t  all adds up in the end. 
4. Under no c ircumstance s  may you mention anything about activities which
might involve you and other participants after the experiment ( i . e . ,  no physical
threats .  deals to split up arterwards ,  o r  leading questions) .
5 .  Each individual will be  paid in private .  Your e ar nings are strictly your 
own business .
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Period Zero 
Auc tione e r ' s  In s tr u c tions 
For period z e r o  I will give a n  example set  o r  bids and offers .  You should 
rec ord the transac tions (accepted bids and offers) corresponding to your seller or 
buyer number onto your &ample Record. Sheet. In subsequent periods you will be 
submitting the bids and of!ers and will be recording your transactions on the real 
Record. Sheet. 
Period Zero is now open. The Bid. Forms and Offer Forms have been received 
from all buyers and sellers and contain the following bids and offers : 
Buyer 1 submits bids at 5020 ,  3000 ,  and 1 04 0 .  
Buyer 2 submits bids a t  4002 ,  400 1 .  and 1 90 0 .  
Buyer 3 submits bids a t  5 5 0 0 ,  3500 ,  and 5 3 7 .  
Buyer 4 submits bids at  5000 and 3 5 1 0 . 
Buyer 5 submits bids at 4080 .  
Buyer 6 submits bids at  4000 ,  2330 ,  and 1 68 .  
Seller 7 submits of!ers at 3000 ,  3400,  and 4000 .  
Seller 8 submits offers at  3300 ,  4450 ,  and 5050 .  
Seller 9 submits of!ers at 3330  and 5600 .  
Seller 10  submits offers at 27 1 0 ,  3 1 80 ,  and 4250 .  
Seller 1 1  submits of!ers at 2800 ,  3 1 00 ,  and 4020 .  
Seller 1 2  submits of!ers a t  3027  and 325 1 .  
The bids are ordered from highest to lowest and the offers from lowest to 
highest .  The bids are then matched to the offers as  follows: 
B i d s 5 5 0 0  5 0 2 0  5 0 0 0  4080  4 0 0 2  40 0 1  4000  3 5 1 0  3 5 0 0  
O t t e r s  2 7 1 0  2800  3 0 0 0  3 0 2 7  3 1 0 0 3 1 8 0 3 2 5 1 3 3 0 0  3 3 3 0  
B i d s 3 0 0 0  2330 1 9 0 0  1 040  5 3 7  1 68 
O f f e r s  3 4 0 0  4 0 0 0  4 0 2 0  4 2 5 0  4 4 5 0  5 0 5 0  5 6 0 0  
Notice that there is an extra offer which cannot b e  matched with a bid.  Any extra 
of!ers or bids are rejected. The first nine (9) matched bids and offers are accepted.
the rest are rejected.  The price is 3 365 (the maximum of the la.st accepted. offer and 
the first rejec ted.  bid. is 3330 and the minimum of the la.st accepted. bid. and the first 
rejected. offer is 3400) .  Were this an actual period all of the Bid. Forms and Offer
Forms wo uld now be returned with the accepted and rejected bids and offers marked 
along with the pric e .  Also, I would announce that the highest accepted bid was 5500 ,  
the lowest accepted offer was  27 1 0 , the last accepted b id  was  3500 ,  the  last  accepted 
offer was 3330 ,  the first rejected bid was 3000,  and the first rejected offer  was 3400
You should now fill  out your &ample Record. Sheets. 
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The market volume for period z ero is 9 units .  Sellers should record the mark­
et volume in row (A) , and the number ot  units that they themselves sold in row (B) . 
Everyone should now c alculate their profit using the forms on the Example 
pag e .  
Buyers should subtract the purchase price o f  their first unit from the 1 st  unit
redemp tion value on their Example Record. Sheet. The same should be done for a_ny 
additional units purchased.  
Sellers  should calculate the volume o f  others [ row (A) - row (B) J and record
this in row ( C) .  They sho uld then examine the column on their Example Cost Sheet  
corresponding to row ( C) .  For some i t  will b e  the  column numbered 8 and for  others 
it will be  the column numbered 7. Next sellers should write the cost  of  their 1 s t  unit
in row ( 2 )  ot their Example Record. Sheet and subtract it from the selling price of their 
first unit sold to determine their profit o n  that unit. The s ame should be done for any 
a dditional units sold .  
Everyone should also answer the questions a t  the bottom of the Example 
Record. Sheet. 
U n i t  Tr a d  in& Per iod 
l'\i r -
c na  .. d lluaber 
3 
4 
... 
.Wdreu 
1 II u n i t  
red .. t ion •elue 
2 
l'u r c hA a •
r i c e  
P r o  1 t  
3 rov l - r ov  2 ) 
S ' 2nd uni t r e d  .. t ion value 
6 Pur c h•••r ic e 
7 Pro i t  
( r ow S • r ov  6 )
a 
10 
ll 
1 2  
1 3  
14 
lS 
1 6 
41 
Purcb.ln 
r i c e  
PTo i t  
( row 9 - r ov  10) 
4t wiit 
red t iDD •alue
Purc haa • 
rice 
PTo 1 t  
(row 1 3  - r ow  1 4 )
Toul pe r  ,., 1114 
37 
Ex ample (Buye rs )
a.cord of P'llrcbHU 11111 IAnilll• ,  lu7er ID ._ 
() 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
lee . ·- · .. .  
Calculate y o ur p rofit f o r  period zer o .  
8 9 1 0  
0 0 0 
11tul '11,.mt 
If ,  in period 1 ,  you bought two units for 2000 e a c h ,  what was your pro fit t o r  
that period'? 
I ! ,  m period 2 ,  you boug h t  one unit for 4000,  what was your profit for that 
period'? 
What was your total  profit for periods 1 and 2'? 
11 
0 
Unit 
Sold 
1 
2 
3 
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Example (Se llers ) 
1 st unit 
2nd unit 
3rd unit 
4th unit
Trad tq Per tod 
a..btt 
• Mubt .... 
I On wNme 
c V°"- tl mm  (rw A . ,.. I) 
l SelUq prtca 
2 Colt of la t ••lt 
Prof 1 t l ov 1 - rov 2 
• 
S Sell 1111 price 
6 Co a t  of 21111 wi1t 
7 Prof 1 t
r ov  - r ov  6 
• 
t Sell Ult pr tee 
10 Colt of >Td •it 
ll PToUtrov t - row 10 
12  
41  Total per '9rio4 
I I  
1 1  
I I  0 1 
7500 6750 
8000 7250 
8500 n5o 
9000 8250 
0 1 
Cost She e t  
Volume o f  Others 
2 3 4 5 8 7 
6000 5250 -4500 3750 3000 2250 
6500 5750 5000 -4250 3500 2750 
7000 6250 5500 -4750 -4000 3250 
7500 8750 8000 5250 -4500 3750 
lecord o t  Sahe aDd Prof it•,  Seller lo ._ 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 
I 
1 500 750 
2000 1 250 
2500 1 750 
3000 2250 
8 9 1 0  1 1  
Im•·------------------- loc , lee . • ·---------- !tit.al Pa,.at. ___ _ 
j,,ddru•· -----------------------------------------
Calculate your profit for period z e r o . 
I r  you s o ld one unit in a market in w hi c h  five units had been sold before s e llmg 
your uni t ,  what is the c o s t  of your znd unit?
It  you s o ld two units in a market in whi c h  no other units had previously b e e n  
s o l d ,  w h a t  i s  t h e  c o s t  o f  your next unit? 
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Bid Fo rm 
Buye r No . _ _ _ _  _ Period ___ _ 
Unit Bid Amount Accepted I Rejected Price 
1 a c c e p t e d  / rej e c te d  
2 a c c e p t e d  I rej e c t e d  
3 a c c e p t e d  / rej e c t e d  
4 a c c ep t e d  / rej e c t ed 
5 a c c ep t e d  / rej e c t e d  
6 a c c ep t e d  I rej e c te d  
7 a c c e p t e d  / rej e c t e d  
8 a c c e p t e d  / rej e c t e d  
9 a c c e p t e d  / rej e c t e d  
1 0  a c c e p t e d  I r ej e c t ed 
T o t a l  Number o f  A c c e p t e d  B i d s :  -----
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Offe r Fo rm 
Seller No . ----- Period ____ _ 
Unit Offer Amount Accepted /Rejected Price 
1 a c c e p t e d / r ej ec t e d  
2 a c c e p t e d /  rej ec t e d  
3 a c c ep t e d  I r e j e c t e d  
4 a c c e p t e d  I rej e c t e d  
5 a c c e p t e d  I r ej e c t e d  
6 a c c ep t e d  I r ej e c t e d  
7 a c c e p te d  I rej e c t e d  
8 a c c e p te d  I rej e c t e d  
9 a c c ep t ed I rej e c t e d  
1 0  a c c e p t e d  I rej e c t e d  . 
T o t a l  � umb e r  o f  Ac c e p te d  O ffe r s :  -----
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Marke t  Organization {Oral Double Auc tion) 
The market tor this commodity is organized as follows : we open the market for 
a trading period (a trading ' day ' ) .  The period lasts nine (9)  minutes .  Any buyer ( se ll­
er) is free at any time during the period to make a verbal bid (ot!er) to buy ( se ll) one 
unit o f  the commo dity at a specified pric e .  The bid (otfer) must  be higher ( lower) 
than the outstanding bid (ot!er) should one exist .  Any seller (buyer) is free at  any 
t ime to accept or not accept the bid (ot!e r) of any buyer ( seller) .  It  a bid (ot!er) ls ac­
cepted a binding c ontract has been c losed for a single unit and the buyer and seller 
will record the contrac t  price to  be included in their profit calculations . Any ties m 
bids or acceptances will be resolved by a random choic e  ot  buyer or  seller .  Except 
for the bids ( otfers) and their acceptance you are not to speak to any other subject .  
There are  likely to  be  many bids and ot!ers that are  not  accepted, but yo u are  free  to 
keep trying , and as a buyer or a se ller you are tree to make as much profit as you 
can. 
A:re there any questions? 
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Final Observations 
1 .  Trading period 0 wtll be a trial period to familiarize you with the p r o ­
c edure and will not  count toward your cash earnings .  
2 .  Each mdividual has a large folder .  All papers . instructions , records , etc .  
should be put into this folder .  Leave the folder with us be fore leaving . Trike natking 
home with you. 
3 .  We are able to advi�e you a little o n  making money. First ,  you should 
remember that pennies add up. Over many trades and a long period of time very 
small amounts e arned on individual trades can add up to a great deal of money . 
Secondly, you should not expect your earnings to be steady .  You will have some good 
periods and some bad periods . During bad times try not to  become frustrated.  Just 
stay in there and keep trying to earn what you can.  It a ll adds up in the end. 
Some people rush to trade . Others find it advantageous to ' ' shop ' ' or spread 
their trading over the period. We are unaware of any particular ' ' be s t ' ' strategies 
and suggest  that yo u adapt accordingly. 
The record sheets sometimes lead people to think an advantage exists in 
recording units in some sequence other than the actual s e quence in which they were 
bought or sold. Consider a buyer with the first two redemption values at  6000 and 
4500 respe ctively. The buyer purchases a first unit at  3500  and a second bec omes 
available at  5000 .  Only the first will be purchased and the total profit would be 2500 . 
Suppose ,  however ,  that the 3500 pric ed  unit is recorded with the 4500 (2nd unit )
redemption value for  a profit of  1 000 .  Then the  5000 priced  unit c an be purchased 
and rec orded with the 6000 ( 1 st  unit) redemption value for a profit of 1 000 .  Notice
that the total profit is now only 2000 .  
Consider a s eller with costs for  the first two units of  3000 and 3500 respec­
tively (volume of others is 6 in this example) . The se ller s ells a first unit at 3900 and
the opportunity arises  to sell a second at 3400 .  Only the first will be sold and the to­
tal profit would be 900 .  Suppose ,  however ,  that the 3900 priced unit is recorded wtth 
the 3500  (2nd unit) cost  for a profit of  400 .  Then the 3400 priced  unit c an be sold
and rec orded with the 3000 ( 1 st  unit) cost  for a profit o f  400 .  Notice that the total
profit is now o nly 800 .  
4 .  Under no circumstances may you mention anything about activities which 
might involve  you and other participants after the experiment ( i .e . .  no phystc al  
threats ,  deals to spl it  up afterwards , or  leading questions) .  
5 .  Each individual will be paid in private .  Your earnings are strictly your 
own business .  
6 .  Buyers tender bids verbally by indicating in  sequence ' 1  (buyer number) 
BIDS ( amount) ' '  or ,  if se llers tender offers . the sequence is  1 1  (seller number) OFFERS 
(amount) . ' '
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Period Zero 
Auc tio n e e r � s  In s tru c ti o n s  
For period zero I will do both the part o t  the buyers and sellers ,  althoug h  you 
will be recording the transactions corresponding to your role onto your &a.m.p l e  
Re c ord .91.eet .  
In subsequent periods you will be do ing the buying and the selling and will be 
recording your transactions on the real Re c ord .91.est.  
Period Zero is now open. 
Buyer 1 bids at 1 500 .  
Seller 7 ot!ers at 6000 .  
Buyer 2 bids at 2500 .  
Buyer 2 ' s  bid cancels Buyer l ' s bid and is  the only outstanding bid. Notice that Buyer 
2 ' s  bid is higher than Buyer 1 ' s .  In o rder for a bid to be admissible it must be an im­
provement over the outstanding bid. 
Buyer 4 bids at 3000 .  
Seller 7 ot!ers at 4500 . 
Seller  7 ' s  otfer is an improvement over the outstanding ot!er of  Seller 1 0  and au­
tomatically cancels Seller l O 's ot!er .  
Buyer 1 bids at 4400 .  
Seller 10  accepts Buyer l ' s b id at 4400 .  
Buyer 1 and Seller 1 0  have a contract at 4400 .  
This is an example of  a contract. Buyer 1 has purchased his / her first  unit and Seller 
1 0  has sold his / her ftrst unit. Both are now working on their second units . Everyone 
else is s till working on their first units .  The market is o pen for any bids and ot!ers . 
As sume that the following additional contracts are also made during period zero :  
Seller 9 and Buyer 6 at  5000 . 
Seller 7 and Buyer 5 at 3770 .  
Seller 1 0  and Buyer 3 a t  400 0 .  
Seller 1 1  and Buyer 4 a t  3890 . 
Seller 1 2  and Buyer 2 at 4505.  
Seller 7 and Buyer 4 at 3500 .  
Seller 1 1  and Buyer 1 at 3655 .  
Seller 8 and Buyer 5 at  3000 .  
The market volume for  period zero is 9 units .  Sellers record the market 
volume in row (A) , and the number of units that they sold themselves in row (B) . 
Calculate your profit using the forms on the E::a.m.ple page. 
Buyers should subtract  their purchase price trom their ftrs t  unit redemption value o n  
the &a.m.ple Re c ord. .shee t  and do the s ame for any subsequent units purchased. 
Sellers should calculate the volume of others [row (A) - row (B)]  and record this in 
row (C) .  They should then examine the column on their E::a.mple Cost .she e t  
corresponding to row (C) .  For some i t  will be  the column numbered 8 and tor  others 
it will be the co lumn numbered 7. Now write the cost o f  the first  unit in row (2)  o f  the 
&a.mpte Record. She e t  and subtract it from the se lling price to determine your profit 
on that unit. Do the same for any additional units .
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--· ---------------------- Soc . Sac . 11o. _____________ Total Payatat ____ _ 
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Cost She e t
Volume of Others 
0 1 2 3 4 5 8 ? 8 8 10 1 1  1 2  13 H Hi us 1? 18 
111l unit 780 700 870 1140 llJO 580 liOO 470 440 410 380 300 270 240 2JO J80 JOO 70 40 
2nd unit ll80 780 7l!O 720 880 IMIO llllO 660 620 480 480 380 :s:.o 320 290 280 J80 J OO  J20 
3rd unit IMO 880 ll30 800 770 740 880 830 800 1170 li40 480 430 400 370 340 2110 230 200 
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